Graduate studies at Western
In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan (2009)
|Abstract||I contend that Nagel’s famous argument in The Possibility of Altruism that causally biffy desires are not required to explain action is intellectually worthless, and thus that many philosophies of action - and some systems of ethics - are based upon a crude blunder. [The essay also ends with a bit of surveying of ordinary folk's intuitions about whether desires are causal.]|
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