Belief merging, judgment aggregation and some links with social choice theory

In this paper we explore the relation between three areas: judgment aggregation, belief merging and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions. When majority voting is applied to some propositions it may however give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions. Starting from this so-called doctrinal paradox, the paper surveys the literature on judgment aggregation, and shows that the application of a well known belief merging operator can dissolve the paradox. Finally, the use of distances is shown to establish a link between belief merging and preference aggregation in social choice theory
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