David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):441 - 456 (2007)
Nihilism, Nietzsche and the Doppelganger Problem Was Nietzsche a nihilist? Yes, because, like J. L. Mackie, he was an error-theorist about morality, including the elitist morality to which he himself subscribed. But he was variously a diagnostician, an opponent and a survivor of certain other kinds of nihilism. Schacht argues that Nietzsche cannot have been an error theorist, since meta-ethical nihilism is inconsistent with the moral commitment that Nietzsche displayed. Schacht’s exegetical argument parallels the substantive argument (advocated in recent years by Wright and Blackburn) that Mackie’s error theory can’t be true because if it were, we would have to give up morality or give up moralizing. I answer this argument with a little bit of help from Nietzsche. I then pose a problem, the Doppelganger Problem, for the meta-ethical nihilism that I attribute to Mackie and Nietzsche. (If A is a moral proposition then not-A is a moral proposition: hence not all moral propositions can be false.) I solve the problem by reformulating the error theory and also deal with a variant of the problem, the Reinforced Doppelganger, glancing at a famous paper of Ronald Dworkin’s. Thus, whatever its demerits, the error theory, is not self-refuting, nor does it require us to give up morality.
|Keywords||Error theory Nihilism Nietzsche J. L. Mackie Doppelganger Bertrand Russell Anti-realism Crispin Wright Simon Blackburn Richard Schacht Sayre-McCord|
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References found in this work BETA
Crispin Wright (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Hartry Field (1989). Realism, Mathematics & Modality. Basil Blackwell.
Ronald Dworkin (1996). Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It. Philosophy and Public Affairs 25 (2):87–139.
Citations of this work BETA
Scott Hill (2008). 'Is'–'Ought' Derivations and Ethical Taxonomies. Philosophia 36 (4):545-566.
Stephen Maitzen (2008). Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill. Philosophia 36 (4):567-574.
Patrick Clipsham (2015). Developing a Post-Prior Taxonomy of Ethical Sentences. Philosophia 43 (3):801-820.
Patrick Clipsham (2013). In Defense of Anti‐Archimedean Moral Realism: A Response to Recent Critics. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):470-484.
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