Snare's puzzle/Hume's purpose: Non-cognitivism and what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is
| Abstract | Frank Snare had a puzzle. He construed Hume as a non-cognitivist, indeed, as the non-cognitivist, the fount and origin of contemporary non-cognitivism. Taking Hume to be a non-cognitivist, Snare devoted a great deal of time and effort to the Motivation Argument, or as he called it, the Influence Argument, which he took to be the chief weapon in Hume | |||||||||
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