David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (3):247-256 (1996)
Abstract It is argued that Arthur Fine's ?natural ontological attitude? (NOA), i.e., the view that science should not be philosophically (either realistically or anti?realistically) interpreted at all but should rather be allowed to ?speak for itself?, is seriously problematic, even though it contains deep insights which philosophers of science should take into account. In particular, Fine succeeds in showing that no non?question?begging, conclusive demonstration of scientific realism (e.g., on ?explanationist? grounds) is possible. But this is not a threat to scientific realism, if realism is subordinated to pragmatism. From the pragmatic point of view, the demand for a non?circular proof of scientific realism is mistaken. Rather, realism can be seen as our natural attitude, based on our practices, scientific and otherwise. Fine's NOA turns out to be, on a charitable reading, quite close to a version of pragmatic realism. The paper concludes by briefly examining the idea of regarding realism as a ?narrative explanation? of science
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Sharon L. Crasnow (2000). How Natural Can Ontology Be? Philosophy of Science 67 (1):114-132.
Joseph Rouse (1988). Arguing for the Natural Ontological Attitude. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:294 - 301.
André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
William Newton-Smith (1988). Modest Realism. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.
Arthur I. Fine (1984). The Natural Ontological Attitude. In J. Leplin (ed.), Scientific Realism. University of California Press. 261--77.
Harald A. Wiltsche (2012). What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism? Inquiry 55 (2):105-130.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
Julia Friederike Göhner & Markus Seidel (2013). Promiscuous Objects, Hybrid Truth and Scientific Realism. In Marie Kaiser & Ansgar Seide (eds.), Philip Kitcher. Pragmatic Naturalism. ontos. 111-127.
Sami Pihlström (2008). How (Not) to Write the History of Pragmatist Philosophy of Science? Perspectives on Science 16 (1):26-69.
Daniel McArthur (2006). Recent Debates Over Structural Realism. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 37 (2):209 - 224.
Stathis Psillos (2005). Scientific Realism and Metaphysics. Ratio 18 (4):385–404.
Richard Reiner & Robert Pierson (1995). Hacking's Experimental Realism: An Untenable Middle Ground. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):60-69.
Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
Added to index2010-09-14
Total downloads10 ( #206,393 of 1,696,445 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #339,109 of 1,696,445 )
How can I increase my downloads?