Acta Analytica 21 (2):87-102 (2006)
|Abstract||I argue that particularism (or holism) about reasons, i.e., the view that a feature that is a reason in one case need not be a reason in another case, is true, but uninterestingly so. Its truth is best explained by principles that govern a weaker notion than that of being a reason: one thing can be ‘normatively connected’ to something else without its being a reason for what it is normatively connected to. Thus, even though true, particularism about reasons does not support the particularist’s general idea that the normative domain is not governed by principles.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge (2007). Turning on Default Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):55-76.
Anna Bergqvist (2010). Why Sibley is Not a Generalist After All. British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (1):1-14.
Vojko Strahovnik (2004). The Riddle of Aesthetic Principles. Acta Analytica 19 (33):189-208.
Roger Crisp (2007). Ethics Without Reasons? Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):40-49.
Pekka Väyrynen (2006). Moral Generalism: Enjoy in Moderation. Ethics 116 (4):707-741.
Jonathan Dancy (2004). Ethics Without Principles. Oxford University Press.
Joshua Gert (2008). Putting Particularism in its Place. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.
Omar Edward Moad (2007). Reasons, Resultance and Moral Particularism. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (226):112-116.
Brendan Larvor (2008). Moral Particularism and Scientific Practice. Metaphilosophy 39 (4-5):492-507.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #78,702 of 549,093 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,390 of 549,093 )
How can I increase my downloads?