Valuing knowledge: A deontological approach [Book Review]
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413 - 428 (2009)
|Abstract||The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.|
|Keywords||Value of knowledge Epistemic value Consequentialism Virtue epistemology Reliabilism|
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