Valuing knowledge: A deontological approach [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):413 - 428 (2009)
The fact that we ought to prefer what is comparatively more likely to be good, I argue, does, contrary to consequentialism, not rest on any evaluative facts. It is, in this sense, a deontological requirement. As such it is the basis of our valuing those things which are in accordance with it. We value acting (and believing) well, i.e. we value acting (and believing) as we ought to act (and to believe). In this way, despite the fact that our interest in justification depends on our interest in truth, we value believing with justification on non-instrumental grounds. A deontological understanding of justification, thus, solves the Value of Knowledge Problem.
|Keywords||Value of knowledge Epistemic value Consequentialism Virtue epistemology Reliabilism|
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References found in this work BETA
Jonathan L. Kvanvig (2003). The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1999). Knowledge in a Social World. Oxford University Press.
Ernest Sosa (2007/2009). A Virtue Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
John Broome (1991). Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time. Wiley-Blackwell.
Linda Zagzebski (2003). The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good. Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.
Citations of this work BETA
Julien Dutant (2013). In Defence of Swamping. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):357-366.
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