David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Synthese 148 (1):79 - 97 (2006)
Davidson's anomalous monism, his argument for the identity between mental and physical event tokens, has been frequently attacked, usually demanding a higher degree of physicalist commitment. My objection runs in the opposite direction: the identities inferred by Davidson from mental causation, the nomological character of causality and the anomaly of the mental are philosophically problematic and, more dramatically, incompatible with his famous argument against the third dogma of empiricism, the separation of content from conceptual scheme. Given the anomaly of the mental and the absence of psychophysical laws, there are no conceptual resources to relate mental and physical predicates. We fall in the third dogma if we claim that the very same token event is mental and physical. One of the premises must be rejected: I will claim that we do not need a law to subsume cause and effect to be entitled to speak of causation. Davidson has never offered an argument to back this premise. Against such a dogma I will sketch some ideas pointing towards a different conception of causality, singularist and undetachable from explanatory practices.
|Keywords||Philosophy Philosophy Epistemology Logic Metaphysics Philosophy of Language|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Donald Davidson (1970). Mental Events. In L. Foster & J. W. Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. Humanities Press 79-101.
G. E. M. Anscombe (1957/2000). Intention. Harvard University Press.
Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.
Donald Davidson (1984). `On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. In Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association. Oxford: Oxford University Press 183-198.
Donald Davidson (1973). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5--20.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. de Pinedo (2006). Anomalous Monism: Oscillating Between Dogmas. Synthese 148 (1):79-97.
Brian P. McLaughlin (1992). On Davidson's Response to the Charge of Epiphenomenalism. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
Ted Honderich (1982). The Argument for Anomalous Monism. Analysis 42 (January):59-64.
Nancy Slonneger Hancock (2001). Anomalous Monism and Physical Closure. Journal of Philosophical Research 26:175-185.
Rex Welshon (1999). Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80 (1):103-120.
Michael V. Antony (2003). Davidson's Argument for Monism. Synthese 135 (1):1-12.
Sophie Gibb (2006). Why Davidson is Not a Property Epiphenomenalist. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 14 (3):407 – 422.
Bruce Goldberg (1977). A Problem with Anomalous Monism. Philosophical Studies 32 (August):175-80.
Andrea Zhok (2011). A Phenomenological Reading of Anomalous Monism. Husserl Studies 27 (3):227-256.
David Pineda Oliva (2001). Un argumento davidsoniano contra el monismo anómalo(A Davidsonian Argument against Anomalous Monism). Critica 33 (97):33 - 61.
Daniel D. Hutto (1998). Davidson's Identity Crisis. Dialectica 52 (1):45-61.
Mark Silcox, Mind and Anomalous Monism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Steven Yalowitz (1998). Causation in the Argument for Anomalous Monism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):183-226.
Stephen J. Noren (1979). Anomalous Monism, Events, and 'the Mental'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 40 (September):64-74.
Peter Smith (1982). Bad News for Anomalous Monism? Analysis 42 (October):220-4.
Added to index2011-05-29
Total downloads6 ( #454,525 of 1,793,096 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #463,412 of 1,793,096 )
How can I increase my downloads?