A priori contributions to scientific knowledge

This paper presents two different kinds a priori entitlements and argues that both are necessary to account for scientific knowledge. On the one hand, there are formal a priori entitlements whose existence is grounded in conditions on concept possession. On the other hand, there are material a priori entitlements that an agent accrues in virtue of practical reasoning. The discussion aims to reconcile the strengths of Christopher Peacocke’s and Michael Friedman’s recent work on the a priori, while overcoming the weaknesses of their respective proposals.
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