David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2004)
Every day we seem to make and act upon all kinds of free choices: some trivial, others so consequential that they change the course of one's life, or even the course of history. But are these choices really free, or are we compelled to act the way we do by factors beyond our control? Is the feeling that we could have made different decisions just an illusion? And if our choices are not free, is it legitimate to hold people morally responsible for their actions? Pink looks at the fundamental philosophical question of free will, Engaging in discussion of the claim: 'If our actions are causally determined by events beyond our control, that means that we can never act freely, and so can never be held responsible for our actions.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism|
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|Call number||BJ1461.P54 2004|
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Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias (2014). Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.
Neelke Doorn (2012). Responsibility Ascriptions in Technology Development and Engineering: Three Perspectives. [REVIEW] Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):69-90.
Tim Bayne (2008). The Phenomenology of Agency. Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
John M. Doris, Joshua Knobe & Robert L. Woolfolk (2007). Variantism About Responsibility. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):183–214.
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