|Abstract||In A Puzzle About Belief, Saul Kripke tells the story of a person caught in a classic Frege case. Peter is unaware that Paderewski the famous Polish politician, and Paderewski the famous Polish musician, are one and the same person. What is supposed to distinguish this Frege case from many others is that Peter associates a single name, 'Paderewski' with both of his conceptions. But not everyone may agree with this description. Richard Larson and Peter Ludlow, and Robert Fiengo and Robert May have suggested that Peter's idiolect contains two 'Paderewski' names (or syntactic expressions). Just as ordinary English speakers may have two 'bank' words each with its own meaning, Peter has two homophonic names each corresponding to one of his conceptions of Paderewski. I will call this position, which will be subject to further clarification, 'the two-name view'. According to the two-name view, the syntactic facts concerning an agent's language should reflect, in this peculiar way, her own perspective on the world. In this sense then, the two-name view is a symptom of an individualistic conception of the words that make up a person's language.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Edward Harcourt (1999). Frege on 'I', 'Now', 'Today' and Some Other Linguistic Devices. Synthese 121 (3):329 - 356.
Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
M. Pelczar & J. Rainsbury (1998). The Indexical Character of Names. Synthese 114 (2):293-317.
R. Mark Sainsbury (2010). Paderewski Variations. Dialectica 64 (4):483-502.
Mark Balaguer (2005). Indexical Propositions and de Re Belief Ascriptions. Synthese 146 (3):325 - 355.
David Boersema (2007). Geach on Proper Names. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:37-42.
Alan Berger (ed.) (2010). Saul Kripke. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads34 ( #40,539 of 722,774 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,774 )
How can I increase my downloads?