David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
I consider here the issue of whether and to what extent moral truths are absolute. My aim is to raise some new considerations in favor of moral relativism: the thesis that some moral statements can vary in truth-value depending on the moral standards at issue.1 2 This paper has three major components. First, I describe a new puzzle concerning the possibility of moral knowledge in light of expert disagreement. I argue that the best solution to this puzzle requires moral relativism. Second, I develop a notion of a moral standard that incorporates recent developments in moral psychology, including work by..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
James Dreier (1990). Internalism and Speaker Relativism. Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
James Beebe (2010). Moral Relativism in Context. Noûs 44 (4):691-724.
Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007). Moral Relativism. Philosophical Studies 135 (2):123 - 143.
Miranda Fricker (2010). The Relativism of Blame and Williams's Relativism of Distance. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):151-177.
Charles Sayward (1989). Do Moral Explanations Matter? Philosophy Research Archives 14:137-142.
Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
David Capps, Michael P. Lynch & Daniel Massey (2009). A Coherent Moral Relativism. Synthese 166 (2):413 - 430.
Charles Sayward (1988). System Relativism. Ratio 1 (2):163-175.
Christian Miller (2011). Moral Relativism and Moral Psychology. In Steven Hales (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Relativism. Blackwell.
Katinka Quintelier & Daniel Fessler (2012). Varying Versions of Moral Relativism: The Philosophy and Psychology of Normative Relativism. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):95-113.
Added to index2010-06-20
Total downloads69 ( #21,331 of 1,102,995 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #84,821 of 1,102,995 )
How can I increase my downloads?