|Abstract||Abstract: My aim in this paper is to articulate an account of scientific modeling that reconciles pluralism about modeling with a modest form of scientific realism. The central claim of this approach is that the models of a given physical phenomenon can present different aspects of the phenomenon. This allows us, in certain special circumstances, to be confident that we are capturing genuine features of the world, even when our modeling occurs in the absence of a fundamental theory. This framework is illustrated using models from contemporary meteorology.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Bradley (2010). Teaching Modeling in Critical Thinking. Teaching Philosophy 33 (2):123-147.
Malcolm A. MacIver (2001). How Building Physical Models Can Reduce and Guide the Abstraction of Nature. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1066-1067.
Anouk Barberousse, Sara Franceschelli & Cyrille Imbert, Cellular Automata, Modeling, and Computation.
James Justus (2005). Qualitative Scientific Modeling and Loop Analysis. Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1272-1286.
Arthur M. Jacobs & Jonathan Grainger (1999). Modeling a Theory Without a Model Theory, or, Computational Modeling “After Feyerabend”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):46-47.
Colleen Murphy, Paolo Gardoni & Charles Harris (2011). Classification and Moral Evaluation of Uncertainties in Engineering Modeling. Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):553-570.
Robert L. Ashenhurst (1996). Ontological Aspects of Information Modeling. Minds and Machines 6 (3):287-394.
Johannes Lenhard (2007). Computer Simulation: The Cooperation Between Experimenting and Modeling. Philosophy of Science 74 (2):176-194.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads30 ( #40,914 of 549,754 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #12,458 of 549,754 )
How can I increase my downloads?