In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism (2011)
|Abstract||Epistemic structural realists have argued that we are in a better epistemic position with respect to the structural claims made by our theories than the non-structural claims. Critics have objected that we cannot make the structure/non-structure distinction precise. I respond that a focus on mathematical structure leads to a clearer understanding of this debate. Unfortunately for the structural realist, however, the contribution that mathematics makes to scientific representation undermines any general confidence we might have in the structural claims made by our theories. Thinking about the role of mathematics in science may also complicate other versions of realism|
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