David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):147-170 (2011)
Some causal explanations are non-committal in that mention of a property in the explanans conveys information about the causal origin of the explanandum even if the property in question plays no causal role for the explanandum . Programme explanations are a variety of non-committal causal (NCC) explanations. Yet their interest is very limited since, as I will argue in this paper, their range of applicability is in fact quite narrow. However there is at least another variety of NCC explanations, causal orientation explanations, which offer a plausible model for many explanations in the special sciences
|Keywords||causal explanations special sciences programme explanations causal exclusion autonomy of special sciences|
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
Gilbert Ryle (1949/2002). The Concept of Mind. Hutchinson and Co.
Jaegwon Kim (1998). Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation. MIT Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
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