Graduate studies at Western
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):211 - 217 (2011)
|Abstract||This discussion note of (Batterman ) clarifies the modest aims of my 'mapping account' of applications of mathematics in science. Once these aims are clarified it becomes clear that Batterman's 'completely new approach' (Batterman , p. 24) is not needed to make sense of his cases of idealized mathematical explanations. Instead, a positive proposal for the explanatory power of such cases can be reconciled with the mapping account|
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