Philosophy of science and history of science: A troubling interaction [Book Review]

History and philosophy complement and overlap each other in subject matter, but the two disciplines exhibit conflict over methodology. Since Hempel's challenge to historians that they should adopt the covering law model of explanation, the methodological conflict has revolved around the respective roles of the general and the particular in each discipline. In recent years, the revival of narrativism in history, coupled with the trend in philosophy of science to rely upon case studies, joins the methodological conflict anew. So long as contemporary philosophy of science relies upon history's methodology to construct its case studies, it subjects itself to a paradoxical situation: the better the history, the worse the philosophy. An example of the methodological conflict is presented in the case of Antoine Lavoisier. This example also serves our ultimateconclusion, which is that distinctively philosophical methods of case-study design promise enhanced prescriptive powers for philosophy of science.
Keywords methodology  philosophy of history  historiography  case-history method  interdisciplinary (philosophy history)
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DOI 10.1023/A:1008353021407
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Jutta Schickore & Klodian Coko (2014). Using Multiple Means of Determination. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):295-313.
Andreas Bartels (2010). Explaining Referential Stability of Physics Concepts: The Semantic Embedding Approach. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):267 - 281.

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