Russell's Last (And Best) Multiple-Relation Theory of Judgement

Mind 117 (465):107 - 139 (2008)
Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the "Theory of Knowledge" manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiple-relation theory to his later views on propositions
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David B. Martens (2010). First-Person Belief and Empirical Certainty. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1):118-136.
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