David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
write to correct errors in Christopher Pincock’s review of my discussion of IRussell. First, according to Pincock, I attempt to “undermine Moore’s views on ethics in Part One, [and] Russell’s conception of analysis in Part Two” by charging them with a pre-Kripkean conflation of necessity with apriority and analyticity. Not so. Although I do show that such conflation had negative consequences for the views of several philosophers, Moore and Russell are not among them. Moore’s error—which marred the defence of his thesis that conclusions about goodness are never consequences of purely descriptive premisses—was in tacitly assuming that all necessary/a priori relations among concepts arise from definitions (see my : –). A similar problem occurs in Russell, but only tangentially in connection with one possible route to his problematic principle () in Our Knowledge of the External World, the critique of which was not as part of any attack on his general conception of analysis (.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ian Proops (2006). Soames on the Metaphysics and Epistemology of Moore and Russell. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 129 (3):627–635.
Christopher Pincock (2002). Russell's Influence on Carnap's Aufbau. Synthese 131 (1):1 - 37.
Christopher Pincock, Scott Soames. Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century_. _Volume 1: The Dawn of.
Nikolay Milkov (2008). Russell's Debt to Lotze. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (2):186-193.
David Kaplan (2005). Reading ‘on Denoting’ on its Centenary. Mind 114 (456):933-1003.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads86 ( #33,466 of 1,725,191 )
Recent downloads (6 months)65 ( #16,865 of 1,725,191 )
How can I increase my downloads?