David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge University Press (1996)
This book presents a new theory of the will - of our capacity for decision making. The book argues that taking a decision to act is something we do, and do freely - as much an action as the actions which our decisions explain - and that our freedom of action depends on this capacity for free decision-making. But decision-making is no ordinary action. Decisions to act also have a special executive function, that of ensuring the rationality of the further actions which they explain. This executive function makes decision-making an action importantly unlike any other, with its own distinctive rationality. Pink's original and highly persuasive study uses this theory of the will to provide new accounts of freedom, action and rational choice. The author argues that, in a tradition that runs from Hobbes to Davidson and Frankfurt, Anglo-American philosophy has misrepresented the common-sense psychology of our freedom and action - a psychology which this book now presents and defends.
|Keywords||Free will and determinism Decision making|
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|Buy the book||$40.99 new (9% off) $43.00 used (5% off) $44.99 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.P55 1996|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
Alfred R. Mele (2007). Persisting Intentions. Noûs 41 (4):735–757.
Alfred R. Mele (2005). Decisions, Intentions, and Free Will. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):146-162.
David Owens (2006). Testimony and Assertion. Philosophical Studies 130 (1):105 - 129.
Fabian Dorsch (2015). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):791-813.
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