David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Argumentation 24 (2):227-252 (2010)
This paper challenges the view that arguments are (by definition, as it were) attempts to persuade or convince an audience to accept (or reject) a point of view by presenting reasons for (or against) that point of view. I maintain, first, that an arguer need not intend any effect beyond that of making it manifest to readers or hearers that there is a reason for doing some particular thing (e.g., for believing a certain proposition, or alternatively for rejecting it), and second that when an arguer is in fact trying to induce an effect above and beyond rendering a reason manifest, the effect intended—the use to which his or her argument is put—need not be that hearers do what the stated reasons are reasons for doing. Where the actual or intended effect of making a reason R for doing X manifest is something other than doing X, I call it an oblique—as opposed to a direct—effect of making that reason manifest. The core of the paper presents an overview or map of the main categories of effect which arguments can have, and the main sub-types within each category, calling attention to the points at which such effects can be indirect or oblique effects. The purpose of that typology is to make it clear (i) how oblique effects can come about and (ii) how important a role they can play in the conduct of argumentation.
|Keywords||Argumentation Reasons Persuasion Communicative context Making manifest|
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References found in this work BETA
Robert B. Brandom (1994). Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Harvard University Press.
Michael Bratman (1999). Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press.
Michael Bratman (1987/1999). Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason. Center for the Study of Language and Information.
L. Jonathan Cohen (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Clarendon Press.
Donald Davidson (1963). Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685-700.
Citations of this work BETA
J. Anthony Blair (2012). Argumentation as Rational Persuasion. Argumentation 26 (1):71-81.
Matthew W. McKeon (2013). On the Rationale for Distinguishing Arguments From Explanations. Argumentation 27 (3):283-303.
David Godden (2010). The Importance of Belief in Argumentation: Belief, Commitment and the Effective Resolution of a Difference of Opinion. Synthese 172 (3):397 - 414.
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