George Campbell's Critique of Hume on Testimony

Journal of Scottish Philosophy 4 (1):1-15 (2006)
Abstract
Abstract At stake in the dispute between Campbell and Hume is the basis for our acceptance of testimony. Campbell argues that, contrary to Hume, our acceptance of testimony is prior to experience, while Hume continues to maintain that the appropriation through testimony of the experience of others depends ultimately on one's own experience. I argue that Hume's remarks about testimony provide a non-circular account of the process by which the experience of others may become one's own; and I suggest that the view of Campbell and Hume as proponents of two radically opposed positions on the epistemology of testimony represents a considerable over-simplification
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Siyaves Azeri (2013). Hume's Social Theory of Memory. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 11 (1):53-68.
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