David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. Oxford University Press. 49 (2013)
Call a thought whose expression involves the utterance of an indexical an indexical thought . Thus, my thoughts that I’m annoyed, that now is not the right time, that this is not acceptable, are all indexical thoughts. Such thoughts present a prima facie problem for the thesis that thought contents are phenomenally individuated -- i.e., that each distinct thought type has a proprietarily cognitive phenomenology such that its having that phenomenology makes it the thought that it is -- given the assumption that phenomenology is intrinsically determined i.e
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