David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36 (2004)
A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p, which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q. This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it. The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections. The second argument uses what I call "minimal pair" experiences--sentences read without and with understanding--to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted
|Keywords||Cognition Externalism Intentionality Metaphysics Phenomenology|
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References found in this work BETA
Saul A. Kripke (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
John Locke (1995). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
David Bourget (2015). The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1).
Daniel A. Wilkenfeld (2013). Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (6):997-1016.
David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici (2014). Tracking Representationalism. In Andrew Bailey (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: The Key Thinkers. Continuum 209-235.
Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget (2014). Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.
Michelle Montague (2009). The Logic, Intentionality, and Phenomenology of Emotion. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):171-192.
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