Change and Selves
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Clarendon Press (1990)
It is a trite fact that changes do occur, yet is it logically contradictory to deny that they do? If Zeno and McTaggart were right, then there is no logical contradiction in such a denial, although this is incompatible with the way in which we normally think of the world. Supporters of the `block view' of the universe believe that there is a sense in which all events may be said to be contemporaneous, like episodes in a book, so that there is no `objective' past or future. The aim of this book is not to demolish belief in the existence of objective change, but to elucidate the conditions under which it makes sense to suppose that changes occur. The book pays particular attention to the existence of selves as one such condition, and concludes that the naturalistic account of change is defective and leaves the sceptic victorious.
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