Endurance and Temporality

Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):157-169 (2010)
Abstract
In the article I compare two theories of existence in time: Simons’s conception of continuants and occurrents and Ingarden’s ontology of temporally determined objects (i.e. objects enduring in time, processes and events). They can be regarded as different positions in the controversy over substantialism. The main problem of this controversy can be expressed by the question: what is the primary way of being in time—endurance or perdurance? Ingarden and Simons admit that there exist objects characterized by both ways of being but for Simons, unlike for Ingarden, perdurants are the basic objects which the world is composed of. My aim is not to assess both ontologies but to use the comparison of them as the basis of a reconstruction of the principal problems contained in the controversy over substantialism
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