Do normative standards advance our understanding of moral judgment?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4):558-559 (2005)
Sunstein's review of research on moral heuristics is rich and informative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit moral errors. We question the value of positing such a normative moral framework for the study of moral judgment. We also propose an alternative standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X05390091
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