``An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism"

Logos 12:27--48 (1991)
Abstract
Only in rational creatures is there found a likeness of God which counts as an image . . . . As far as a likeness of the divine nature is concerned, rational creatures seem somehow to attain a representation of [that] type in virtue of imitating God not only in this, that he is and lives, but especially in this, that he understands (ST Ia Q.93 a.6).
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2009-03-08
I do now know how much serious discussion among professional philosophers has been devoted Plantinga's argument that evolutionary theory provides an argument against naturalism, though I know it is widely heralded by many non-professionals who do not like evolutionary theory.

Plantinga's error is two-fold.  First, he fails to state his general epistemological position, and so leaves us wondering what he means by "truth."  Second, and more detrimental to his argument, he fails to consider the possibility of epistemological behaviorism.

Consider any of Plantinga's examples of how evolution might have one survive perfectly well with a set of mostly false beliefs.  One might, for example, run up a tree when confronted with a tiger, because one believed that this was the best way to pet the cute, furry animal.  Thus, one's actions would lead to survivale, but one would be acting on a false belief.

Under what conditions could we establish that this man believed one thing, and not another?  Wha ... (read more)
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