David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Dialectica 50 (2):91-120 (1996)
summaryMartin and Pfeifer have claimed“that the most typical characterizations of intentionality… all fail to distinguish … mental states from …dispositional physical states.”The evidence they present in support of this thesis is examined in the light of the possibility that what it shows is that intentionality is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional. Of the five marks of intentionality they discuss a critical examination shows that three of them, Brentano's inexistence of the intentional object, Searle's directedness and Anscombe's indeterminacy, are features which distinguish T‐inten Tional/dispositional The other two are either, as in the case of Chisholm's permissible falsity of a propositional attitude ascription, a feature of linguistic utterances too restricted in its scope to be of interest, or, as in the case of Frege's indirect reference/Quine's referential opacity, evidence that the S‐intenSional locution is a quotation either of what someone has said in the past or might be expected to say, if the question were to arise at some time in the future
|Keywords||Epistemology Intentionality Language Mental Reference Searle, J|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jan Hauska (2009). Dispositions Unmasked. Theoria 75 (4):304-335.
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2012). The Regress of Pure Powers Revisited. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):n/a-n/a.
Jan Hauska (2008). In Defence of Causal Bases. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43.
Stephen Mumford (1999). Intentionality and the Physical: A New Theory of Disposition Ascription. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):215-25.
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (2013). Properties: Qualities, Powers, or Both? Dialectica 67 (1):55-80.
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