David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 50 (195):225-30 (1999)
Martin and Pfeifer claim ‘that the most typical characterizations of intentionality’ proposed by philosophers are satisfied by physical dispositions. If that is correct, we must conclude either, as they do and as Mumford (this volume) does, that the philosophers are wrong and intentionality is something else or, as I do, that intentionality is what the philosophers say it is, in which case it is the mark, not of the mental, but of the dispositional; the intentionality of a disposition consists in its being directed towards its future manifestations. Mumford objects that the notion of directedness is obscure and cannot in the light of Martin’s electro‐fink argument be elucidated by reference to what would happen if the conditions for its manifestation are satisfied. But Martin‘s argument rests on the mistaken assumption that causal conditionals, of which dispositional ascriptions are an instance, are of the form ‘If p then q’
|Keywords||Intentionality Logic Mental States Metaphysics Martin, C Mumford, S Pfeifer, K|
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References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1997). A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge University Press.
D. Armstrong, C. B. Martin & U. T. Place (1996). In T. Crane. In Tim Crane (ed.), Dispositions: A Debate. New York: Routledge.
Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
C. B. Martin (1994). Dispositions and Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.
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