David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Faith and Philosophy 4 (4):403-426 (1987)
The question is: how should a theist think of justification or positive epistemic status? The answer I suggest is: a belief B has positive epistemic status for S only if S’s faculties are functioning properly (i.e., functioning in the way God intended them to) in producing B, and only if S’s cognitive environment is sufficiently similar to the one for which her faculties are designed; and under those conditions the more firmly S is inclined to accept B, the more positive epistemic status it has for her. I conclude by making some qualifications and applications and exmaining some objections
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James E. Taylor (1990). Epistemic Justification and Psychological Realism. Synthese 85 (2):199 - 230.
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