Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
How can the fine-grained phenomenology of conscious experience arise from neural processes in the brain? How does a set of action potentials become like the feeling of pain in one's experience? Contemporary neuroscience is teaching us that our mental states correlate with neural processes in the brain. However, although we know that experience arises from a physical basis, we don't have a good explanation of why and how it so arises. The problem of how physical processes give rise to experience is called the 'hard problem' of consciousness and it is the contemporary manifestation of the mind-body problem. This book explains the key concepts that surround the issue as well as the nature of the hard problem and the several approaches to it. It gives a comprehensive treatment of the phenomenon incorporating its main metaphysical and epistemic aspects, as well as recent empirical findings, such as the phenomenon of blindsight, change blindness, visual-form agnosia and optic ataraxia, mirror recognition in other primates, split-brain cases and synaesthesia
|Keywords||Phenomenology Philosophy of mind Consciousness|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$94.92 used (1% off) $94.97 new (1% off) $95.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||B829.5.P53 2011|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
M. Almotahari (2013). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding the Relation Between Experience and Neural Processes in the Brain * by Dimitris Platchias. Analysis 73 (1):196-198.
Dimitris Platchias (2011). Phenomenal Consciousness: Understanding The Relation Between Neural Processes And Experience. Acumen.
Mark Rowlands (2003). Consciousness: The Transcendalist Manifesto. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):205-21.
Ansgar Beckermann (1995). Visual Information Processing and Phenomenal Consciousness. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
Pete Mandik (2008). An Epistemological Theory of Consciousness? In Alessio Plebe & Vivian De La Cruz (eds.), Philosophy in the Neuroscience Era. Squilibri.
Pierre Perruchet & Annie Vinter (2002). The Self-Organizing Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3):297-388.
William S. Robinson (2004). Understanding Phenomenal Consciousness. Cambridge University Press.
Barry F. Dainton (2000). Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in Conscious Experience. Routledge.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1998). The Disunity of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
Kevin J. O'Regan, Erik Myin & No (2001). Toward an Analytic Phenomenology: The Concepts of "Bodiliness" and "Grabbiness". In A. Carsetti (ed.), Seeing and Thinking. Reflections on Kanizsa's Studies in Visual Cognition. Kluwer.
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1997). Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It. Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
J. O’Regan, Erik Myin & Alva Noë (2005). Sensory Consciousness Explained in Terms of 'Corporality' and 'Alerting Capacity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2011-05-21
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?