Surviving personal identity theory: Recovering interpretability

Hypatia 23 (4):pp. 90-109 (2008)
Marya Schechtman’s narrative self-constitution view relies on an account of reality as self-evident that eclipses the interpretive labor required to fix the content of intelligibility. As a result, her view illegitimately limits what counts as identity-conferring narrative and problematically excludes many with psychiatric disabilities from the category of full personhood. Plantikow cautions personal identity theorists against this move and offers an alternative approach to engaging in and conceptualizing narrative construction.
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References found in this work BETA
Ian Hacking (1991). On Boyd. Philosophical Studies 61 (1-2):149 - 154.
David Lewis (1976). Survival and Identity. In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. 17-40.

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