Indeterminism is a modal notion: branching spacetimes and Earman's pruning [Book Review]

Synthese 187 (2):441-469 (2012)
Abstract
The paper defends an Aristotelian notion of indeterminism, as rigorously formulated in the framework of branching space-times (BST) of Belnap (1992), against the model-theoretic characterization of indeterminism that Montague (1962) introduced into the philosophy of science. It delineates BST branching against the background provided by Earman's (2008) distinction between individual vs. ensemble branching. It describes a construction of physically-motivated BST models, in which histories are isomorphic to Minkowski spacetime. Finally it responds to criticism leveled against BST by addressing some semantical questions, a topological issue, and the past/future asymmetry
Keywords Indeterminism/determinism  Spacetimes  Branching space-times  Tenses
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