Oxford University Press (1993)
|Abstract||In this companion volume to Warrant: The Current Debate, Plantinga develops an original approach to the question of epistemic warrant; that is what turns true belief into knowledge. He argues that what is crucial to warrant is the proper functioning of one's cognitive faculties in the right kind of cognitive environment.|
|Keywords||Knowledge, Theory of Belief and doubt Cognition|
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|Buy the book||$18.98 used (53% off) $33.95 new (16% off) $38.00 direct from Amazon (5% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD161.P57 1993|
|ISBN(s)||0195078632 0195078640 9780195078640 9780195078633|
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