Wittgenstein et les théories du jugement de Russell et de Meinong

Dialogue 44 (2):249-284 (2005)
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Abstract

One of the main challenges faced by Russell's theory of judgement was to provide a satisfactory account of judgement that was not committed to the existence of true, false, or non-existent complex entities such as Meinongian objectives. In the study of the Russell-Wittgenstein debate on that theory, scholars never considered the idea that Wittgenstein might not have followed Russell on that issue. In this article. I address that question and hold, first, that problems raised by Russell's theory of judgement find their solution in the picture theory. Then, I show that Wittgenstein hesitated for a long period of time in the Notebooks between a version of his solution which is committed to the existence of possible complex entities and one which is not. Finally, I argue that he did, along with Meinong, go for a committing version in the Tractatus.

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Jimmy Plourde
Université du Québec à Trois-Rivières

References found in this work

The problems of philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - New York: Barnes & Noble.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Mind 21 (84):556-564.
Notebooks, 1914-1916.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1961 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Edited by G. H. von Wright & G. E. M. Anscombe.
The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 21 (1):22-28.

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