A Here-Now Theory of Indexicality

This paper attempts to define indexicality so as to semantically distinguish indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions. The widely-accepted approach that says that indexical reference is distinctive in being dependent on context of use is criticized. A reductive approach is proposed and defended that takes an indexical to be (roughly) an expression that either is or is equivalent to ‘here’ or ‘now’, or is such that a tokening of it refers by relating something to the place and/or time that would have been referred to had ‘here’ and ‘now’ been tokened instead. Alternative reductive approaches are criticized.
Keywords proper names  definite descriptions  singular reference  context  acts of ostension  haecceity  persons  David Kaplan
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_1993_24
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Wayne A. Davis (2013). Minimizing Indexicality. Philosophical Studies 168 (1):1-20.

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