David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 27 (4):333-355 (2006)
In this article, I argue that it is wrong to conduct any experiment on a nonhuman which we would regard as immoral were it to be conducted on a human, because such experimentation violates the basic moral rights of sentient beings. After distinguishing the rights approach from the utilitarian approach, I delineate basic concepts. I then raise the classic “argument from marginal cases” against those who support experimentation on nonhumans but not on humans. After next replying to six important objections against that argument, I contend that moral agents are logically required to accord basic moral rights to every sentient being. I conclude by providing criteria for distinguishing ethical from unethical experimentation.
|Keywords||argument from marginal cases experimentation homocentrism moral agents moral rights sentient beings speciesism utilitarianism|
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References found in this work BETA
Tom Regan (2009). The Case for Animal Rights. In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Noûs. Oxford University Press 425-434.
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Citations of this work BETA
Andrew Fenton (2012). On the Need to Redress an Inadequacy in Animal Welfare Science: Toward an Internally Coherent Framework. Biology and Philosophy 27 (1):73-93.
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