Philosophical Studies 156 (1):15-31 (2011)
|Abstract||Philosophers often hold that the aim of conceptual analysis is to discover the representational content of a given concept such as free will , belief , or law . In From Metaphysics to Ethics and other recent work, Frank Jackson has developed a theory of conceptual analysis that is one of the most advanced systematizations of this widespread idea. I argue that this influential way of characterizing conceptual analysis is too narrow. I argue that it is possible that an expressivist account could turn out to be correct as a genuine conceptual analysis of a genuine concept . I claim that since an expressivist analysis does not aim to discover the representational content of a given conceptâ€”and, indeed, might itself be based on the idea that the concept in question is not even representational in natureâ€”the possibility of expressivist conceptual analysis shows that Jacksonâ€™s theory of conceptual analysis is incomplete as it currently stands. I conclude that Jackson needs to either shift his basic understanding of the nature of conceptual analysis or commit to a particular normative reinterpretation of his project|
|Keywords||Conceptual analysis Concepts Expressivism Philosophical methodology Frank Jackson Allan Gibbard|
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