Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference

Abstract The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).
Keywords universals  individuation  particulars  intuition (Anschauung)  Geist  description  nonqualitative  pointing out  displacing  indexicals
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