Kant's neglected argument against consequentialism

Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):501-520 (1991)
The paper interprets Kant’s neglected argument at FOUNDATIONS 401 as consisting of these two premises and conclusion: (1) It follows from consequentialism that in a natural paradise people would not be obligated to be morally good. (2) But this is absurd; one ought to be morally good no matter what. Therefore, consequentialism is false. It is shown that this argument is a powerful one, mainly by showing that independent grounds support (2) and that (1) may survive a number of strong possible objections. One that it does not appear to survive, though, is that the paradise envisioned is not logically possible.
Keywords utopia  desire  good will  happiness  utilitarianism  ethical altruism  consequentialism  Immanual Kant  David Hume  Grundlegung
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DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1991.tb00606.x
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PhilPapers Archive Gilbert Plumer, Kant's neglected argument against consequentialism
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David Evans (2008). The Highest Good in the Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:59-65.
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