On vegetarianism, morality, and science: A counter reply
Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 6 (2) (1993)
| Abstract | I recently took issue with Kathryn George's contention that vegetarianism cannot be a moral obligation for most human beings, even assuming that Tom Regan's stringent thesis about the equal inherent value of humans and many sentient nonhumans is correct. I argued that both Regan and George are incorrect in claiming that his view would permit moral agents to kill and eat innocent, non-threatening rights holders. An unequal rights view, by contrast, would permit such actions if a moral agent's health or life is at stake. I then argued that current nutritional research does not support Professor George's claim that some wealthy adult males (and many fewer wealthy women) are the only persons whose health does not require the consumption of nonhuman animals and their products. In her 1992 response to my critique, George did not address my moral argumentation. She concentrated her entire paper on a wholesale rejection of my discussion of nutrition. Although she now takes a somewhat more moderate position on who can safely contemplate strict vegetarianism, she still believes that most people are not in a position to follow such a diet. In my counter-reply, I argue that her rejection is based upon numerous distortions, omissions, and false charges of fallacy. She even devotes a substantial section of her paper to criticizing me for saying the opposite of what I actually wrote. As I did in my earlier paper, I cite current research, including George's own preferred source on the topic of vegetarianism, to support my view. I conclude that Professor George has still not shown that for most human beings it is dangerous to follow a diet that omits nonhuman animals and their products. Moral agents who take the rights of humansand nonhumans seriously will find vegetarianism well worth considering. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesEvelyn B. Pluhar (1988). When is It Morally Acceptable to Kill Animals? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 1 (3):211-224.
Ben Almassi (2011). The Consequences of Individual Consumption: A Defence of Threshold Arguments for Vegetarianism and Consumer Ethics. Journal of Applied Philosophy 28 (4):396-411.
Kathryn Paxton George (1992). The Use and Abuse of Scientific Studies. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2).
Cathryn Bailey (2007). We Are What We Eat: Feminist Vegetarianism and the Reproduction of Racial Identity. Hypatia 22 (2):39-59.
David Detmer (2007). Vegetarianism, Traditional Morality, and Moral Conservatism. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:39-48.
Jan Deckers (2009). Vegetarianism, Sentimental or Ethical? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 22 (6).
George Nicholson (1801/1999). George Nicholson's on the Primeval Diet of Man (1801): Vegetarianism and Human Conduct Toward Animals. E. Mellen Press.
Kathryn Paxton George (1990). So Animal a Human ..., Or the Moral Relevance of Being an Omnivore. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 3 (2):172-186.
Evelyn Pluhar (1994). Vegetarianism, Morality, and Science Revisited. Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 7 (1).
Evelyn Pluhar (1992). Who Can Be Morally Obligated to Be a Vegetarian? Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 5 (2).
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads35 ( #34,173 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
