The myth of the specious present

Mind 94 (373):19-35 (1985)
The doctrine of the specious present holds that sensation at an instant encompasses objects as they are over an interval. Now there actually is intersubjective agreement with respect to past, present, and future determinations, and it is a necessary condition for legitimately postulating them as objective. I argue that the specious present doctrine would make this actuality an impossibility, and that the data on which the doctrine is based do not in fact support it.
Keywords sensation  motion  memory  phenomenology  William James  McTaggart  A-determinations  B-relations
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DOI 10.1093/mind/XCIV.373.19
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Barry Dainton (2008). Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.
Ian Phillips (2014). Experience of and in Time. Philosophy Compass 9 (2):131-144.

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