Infinitism and epistemic normativity

Synthese 178 (3):515-527 (2011)
Abstract
Klein’s account of epistemic justification, infinitism, supplies a novel solution to the regress problem. We argue that concentrating on the normative aspect of justification exposes a number of unpalatable consequences for infinitism, all of which warrant rejecting the position. As an intermediary step, we develop a stronger version of the ‘finite minds’ objection.
Keywords Infinitism  Epistemic responsibility  Normativity  Regress problem  Klein
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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Citations of this work BETA
John Turri (2013). Infinitism, Finitude and Normativity. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):791-795.
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