Reconciling semantic dispositionalism with semantic holism

Philosophia 38 (1):169-178 (2010)
Abstract
Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.
Keywords Dispositionalism  Holism  Conceptual role  Mental content  Kripke  Boghossian
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References found in this work BETA
Ned Block (1988). Functional Role and Truth Conditions. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 61:157-181.
Graeme R. Forbes (1983). Scepticism and Semantic Knowledge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 84:223-37.

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