Reconciling semantic dispositionalism with semantic holism

Philosophia 38 (1):169-178 (2010)
Dispositionalist theories of mental content have been attacked on the grounds that they are incompatible with semantic holism. In this paper, I resist important worries of this variety, raised by Paul Boghossian. I argue that his objections can be avoided by a conceptual role version of dispositionalism, where the multifarious relationships between mental contents are grounded on the relationships between their corresponding, grounding dispositions.
Keywords Dispositionalism  Holism  Conceptual role  Mental content  Kripke  Boghossian
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-009-9203-7
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Ruth G. Millikan (1989). In Defense of Proper Functions. Philosophy of Science 56 (June):288-302.

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