Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts

Theoria 76 (2):112-118 (2010)
From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
Keywords conjunction of beliefs  normativity of belief
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DOI 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2010.01062.x
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PhilPapers Archive Adam C. Podlaskowski, Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts
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References found in this work BETA
Nishi Shah (2003). How Truth Governs Belief. Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.
Roy A. Sorensen (1988). Blindspots. Oxford University Press.

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