Unbelievable thoughts and doxastic oughts

Theoria 76 (2):112-118 (2010)
Abstract
From the dictum "ought implies can", it has been argued that no account of belief's normativity can avoid the unpalatable result that, for unbelievable propositions such as "It is raining and nobody believes that it is raining", one ought not to believe them even if true. In this article, I argue that this move only succeeds on a faulty assumption about the conjunction of doxastic "oughts.".
Keywords conjunction of beliefs  normativity of belief
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References found in this work BETA
Allan Gibbard (2005). Truth and Correct Belief. Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.

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