David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):167 - 185 (2001)
The current debate over systematicity concerns the formal conditions a scheme of mental representation must satisfy in order to explain the systematicity of thought.1 The systematicity of thought is assumed to be a pervasive property of minds, and can be characterized (roughly) as follows: anyone who can think T can think systematic variants of T, where the systematic variants of T are found by permuting T’s constituents. So, for example, it is an alleged fact that anyone who can think the thought that John loves Mary can think the thought that Mary loves John, where the latter thought is a systematic variant of the former.
|Keywords||systematicity language of thought Fodor connectionism|
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Citations of this work BETA
Aldo Frigerio, Alessandro Giordani & Luca Mari (2013). On Representing Information: A Characterization of the Analog/Digital Distinction. Dialectica 67 (4):455-483.
Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada (2011). Levels of Explanation Vindicated. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.
Matthew Katz (2016). Analog Representations and Their Users. Synthese 193 (3):851-871.
Víctor Verdejo (2015). The Systematicity Challenge to Anti-Representational Dynamicism. Synthese 192 (3):701-722.
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