'An Almost Single Inference' – Kant's Deduction of the Categories Reconsidered

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1515/AGPH.2008.013
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 16,667
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Paul L. Franco (2012). Are Kant's Concepts and Methodology Inconsistent with Scientific Change? Constitutivity and the Synthetic Method in Kant. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (2):321-353.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Frederick Rauscher (2014). The Second Step of the B‐Deduction. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):396-419.
Nathan Bauer (2010). Kant's Subjective Deduction. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
Robert Hanna (2011). Kant's Non-Conceptualism, Rogue Objects, and The Gap in the B Deduction. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):399 - 415.
Stefanie Grüne (2011). Is There a Gap in Kant's B Deduction? International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (3):465 - 490.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

35 ( #93,308 of 1,726,249 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #231,316 of 1,726,249 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.