A resource-bounded agent addresses the newcomb problem

Synthese 176 (1):57 - 82 (2010)
In the Newcomb problem, the standard arguments for taking either one box or both boxes adduce what seem to be relevant considerations, but they are not complete arguments, and attempts to complete the arguments rely upon incorrect principles of rational decision making. It is argued that by considering how the predictor is making his prediction, we can generate a more complete argument, and this in turn supports a form of causal decision theory
Keywords Newcomb problem  Rational decision making  Resource-bounded  Causal probability  Causal decision making
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    References found in this work BETA
    David Lewis (1981). Causal Decision Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (1):5 – 30.

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