A refined theory of counterfactuals
Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):239 - 266 (1981)
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S. Barker (2003). A Dilemma for the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (1):62 – 77.
Michael Esfeld (2010). Causal Overdetermination for Humeans? Metaphysica 11 (2):99-104.
S. Barker (1999). Counterfactuals, Probabilistic Counterfactuals and Causation. Mind 108 (431):427-469.
Igal Kvart (1994). Counterfactuals: Ambiguities, True Premises, and Knowledge. Synthese 100 (1):133 - 164.
Daniel Hunter & Reed Richter (1978). Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Paradox. Synthese 39 (2):249 - 261.
Douglas Kutach (2002). The Entropy Theory of Counterfactuals. Philosophy of Science 69 (1):82-104.
Richard Otte (1987). Indeterminism, Counterfactuals, and Causation. Philosophy of Science 54 (1):45-62.
John Hawthorne (2005). Chance and Counterfactuals. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):396–405.
Stephen Barker (2011). Can Counterfactuals Really Be About Possible Worlds? Noûs 45 (3):557-576.
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